[Article by K.I. Angelopoulos: "Seeking Roles and Influence in the Balkans...." Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 17 Nov 91 p 9]

[Text] For some time now Greek diplomacy has centered its attention on the Balkans. Not only to confront the well-known--and complex--problems that have been created in that region, but also because the government, according to reliable sources, does not believe that under the present circumstances there are any prospects for immediate developments on the Cyprus issue and for any substantial improvement in Greek-Turkish relations.

Strong Interest

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, of course, knows the scope and size of the problems our country has to face in the Balkans. It also knows that it is essential to find a "role" for Greece in this region where many things are scheduled to be "played" in the years to come. Moreover, Washington, too, is calling for a "role" from Athens in the Balkans. Washington has never concealed its lively interest over developments in the Balkans which, among other things, give the United States--as well as to certain other European countries--opportunities for "zones of influence."

However, Greek foreign policy does not appear to have progressed much on this issue. With the disadvantage, of course, of the country's bad economic situation, Athens is moving forward with much hesitation over the correctness of certain options in the Balkan "chess game." And for that reason it has not managed in getting any initiative made by it on the region "passed," in succeeding in developing any firm alliance, or even in opening up prospects for anything like that.

With Albania

Athens still does not have any substantial "access" to neighboring Albania. The small amount of economic aid the Greek Government promised Tirana, as a show of its good intentions and capabilities, has still not crossed the Greek-Albanian frontier. At the same time, Athens has still not managed to create an atmosphere of trust vis-a-vis Tirana, with the result, of course, being that Italy's "influence" in Albania is presently complete. As much as Tirana's fear and insecurity vis-a-vis Athens are in certain respects exaggerated, the fact should not be ignored that this is due to a large extent to Greece's stance that appears to want to, but cannot change the situation....

Skopje

Greek foreign policy on the Skopje issue also appears to be changeable. In this case it is Athens that shows that it is obsessed by insecurity and fears vis-a-vis a weak Skopje with an uncertain future. Indicative of Greece's perplexity is also the spasmodic and hasty positioning by Greece on the matter of preconditions for a future recognition of an independent state of Skopje. And yet, Athens knows that Skopje, pressured by many sides, does not have much latitude for any "offensive game" vis-a-vis Greece. To the contrary, indeed, Skopje's recent attitude shows that the disposition of this "peculiar" neighbor is to handle the situation with Greece in such a way as not to leave any doors open for any lengthy dispute.

At any rate, the Greek Government is already accepting advice from both Greeks and foreigners for some "other approach" to the matter. The view is being formulated that Greece, by remaining steadfast, of course, to a series of points (frontiers, "an end to matters regarding minorities, etc.") will be able to gain more if, taking advantage of Skopje's insecurity, it were to move forward toward making an "overture" to it. Those who propose such a view point out to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that a breakup of the federative small state of Skopje cannot at all be to Greece's advantage since that would in all probability lead to "fierce" vicissitudes regarding frontier changes in the Balkans.

According to these same sources, what Athens should pay close attention to is the matter of the U.S. services creating an artificial "Macedonian minorities" problem in our country. If Washington wants Athens to share the view than an independent small state of Skopje in the future would function as a "pillow" in that explosive region, it should, at any rate, also be convinced that Greece cannot accept a "game" with a "minority."

With Bulgaria

The issue of Greek-Bulgarian relations because of Turkey's "wedge" in Zhelev's country is also a difficult one for Athens. Greece continues to have good relations with Sofia, where, however, much has changed and where perhaps much more will change in the future. Bulgaria is presently caught in Turkey's "Muslim" trap with people in the current regime promoting military cooperation with Ankara while Washington is not at all unhappy with all of this.

At the same time, in the face of Turkey's economic "inroad" into Bulgaria, Greece is very much behind, since, indeed, the business world of northern Greece has not yet been "mobilized" to reach out to Bulgaria economically speaking, as the government would have liked and expected. And yet, according to information, Sofia (where there are many forces that are very much displeased over the Turkish "trap") is seeking a development of economic and trade relations and seeks from Greece new "avenues" of cooperation. However, it is meeting with Greek "obstructions." Thus, substantial "access" by Greece into Bulgaria does not exist either. And questions about the future of the original Athens-Sofia-Ankara "triangle" (with Thraki being the centerpiece of Greek anxiety) remain--together with the big questions on the capability of our country to assume some "role" in the region.